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 Over the past few years, I have observed numerous commentators, pundits, and self-
appointed experts of nearly every political stripe describe their views on whether or not the U.S. 
was wise to have “allowed” early elections in Iraq.1 Generally the answer to the question tends to 
lie in the affirmative among defenders of the Bush administration, and in the negative among its 
detractors. After living in Iraq for nearly four cumulative years following the fall of the Saddam 
regime, it appears to me that any cogent response to the question is far more nuanced than the 
yes or no answer it seems designed to solicit. 
 
 Nevertheless, I offer this skeletal answer, the basis of which I will seek to explain in this 
Essay: This is the wrong question to ask. The question, rather, should be, to the extent that early 
elections take place in Iraq, what is it that the U.S. and the international community might do to 
limit any civil conflict that might arise as a result, and what are the costs associated with any 
such policy? 
 
 This Essay addresses these questions in three parts. The first part sets forth why the 
question being asked, the wisdom of early elections, is the wrong one. In fact, the question is not 
just misplaced, but there is almost a certain postcolonial arrogance associated with its premise. 
When asked as a policy matter, the answer is expected to help the U.S., and the broader 
international community, learn more about whether or not it should have dealt with the situation 
differently, and what lessons could be drawn from the Iraqi experience that might be applicable 
elsewhere. What the native population may have wanted, or even demanded, seems almost from 
the terms of the debate to be unworthy of consideration. In fact, in the case of Iraq, local 
demands controlled the outcome almost entirely, and the only lesson that might well be drawn 
from Iraq is that in some cases it is a waste of time to ponder whether or not early elections are a 
good idea, because those doing the pondering will exercise at most marginal control over the 
timing. 
 
 Context, as always, is everything. In Iraq, a majority Shi’a population was fiercely 
repressed under one of the cruelest and most totalitarian dictatorships in the contemporary era. It 
is virtually inconceivable that the leaders of any such population in modern times even casually 
aware of global trends respecting democratization would not couch their demands for political 
recognition in democratic terms and demand immediate elections. Once the demands were so 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
1 For a recent, unusually thoughtful example, from a true expert, see Feisal Istrabadi, A Constitution 
without Constitutionalism: Reflections on Iraq’s Failed Constitutional Process, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1627 
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couched, with what one must assume was utmost sincerity on the part of the population in 
question, countering such demands, or even substantially slowing their recognition, was all but 
impossible. 
 
 Part II will show that, as many suspect, the rush to democratic, and indeed constitutional, 
rule in Iraq was precipitous and destabilizing, even if inevitable. It cemented the notion that 
power is projected on the basis of parties and institutions based almost entirely on sect or 
ethnicity, and not on political platform or ideology. This rather poisonous theory now seems 
nearly impossible to displace in the near term, and indeed is thoroughly assumed in Iraq’s 
institutions of governance, such that the major objectives of the various party lists seems to be 
increasing their ethnic or sectarian representation in the government rather than in engaging in 
effective governance. Indeed, effective governance is a rather poor political strategy to ensure 
continued parliamentary representation once it is conceded that one can only hope to draw votes 
within an ethnic or sectarian group. 
 
 The recent March 2010 elections hardly seem to change this result. While much was 
made of the fact that Ayad Allawi of the Iraqiya List was a Shi’i who managed to win Sunni 
support, less discussed was the fact that beyond possibly a secular Shi’i elite that is concentrated 
in urban centers, Allawi’s list seems to have fared extremely poorly among the Shi’a themselves. 
Thus, in the nine Shi’a dominated provinces (Babil, Basra, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Karbala, Maysan, 
Muthanna, Qadissiya and Wasit), Allawi managed only twelve of 119 available seats.2 That the 
leader of what has become the Sunni list is a Shi’i is of course noteworthy and suggests that 
identitarianism in Iraq does not reach the level of vitriol that is often seen elsewhere in the globe. 
Nevertheless, it does nothing to demonstrate the existence of a political realignment in favor of 
broad-based nonsectarian parties, given the sectarian nature of support offered to Allawi’s 
coalition. 
 
 Having shown in Part I that questioning the wisdom of early elections serves no purpose, 
and having shown in Part II that nevertheless, early elections can foment civil division, Part III 
will address the proper question; namely, what might well be done by the international 
community about such division if early elections are held? In Iraq, the answer was clear: a great 
deal. While ethnic or sectarian division was and is reality in Iraq, ethnic or sectarian violence has 
not been the rule for most of the post-Saddam era. Iraq went through a horrific spasm of 
identitarian violence that will not soon be forgotten, but has thankfully righted itself from such 
horrors. In Baghdad, company and project offices such as our own—in which Christian, Shi’i, 
Sunni and Kurdish Iraqis work together—are not uncommon at this time, even if it is clear where 
the loyalties of the respective members of our staff will lie in the voting booths. U.S. policy has 
something to do with this salutary result. Nevertheless, the price paid for such avoidance of 
violence, even if worth its value, is steep indeed. In order to placate every identitarian based 
constituency, a form of consensual politics has begun to reign in Iraq, and no action of even the 
slightest significance is undertaken without the approval of each constituent group. The result, all 
too often, is that nothing is done, and a barely functioning, incompetent and ineffective 
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2010 / Identitarian Violence and Identitarian Politics 84 
government has taken root, one with which Iraqis are thoroughly disenchanted and one which 
seems entirely disconnected from the realities of their lives. Or rather had taken root, prior to the 
March 2010 elections. As of this writing, Iraq’s historic demand for some form of consensus has 
made it impossible to even form a government, and American desires to ensure that neither 
Sunnis, nor Shi’is, nor Kurds are shut out of the process only seem to cause the process to drag 
out even longer. Again, American policy may well be correct, as the exclusion of one or another 
identitarian groups may well lead to some form of genocidal catastrophe. But it does contribute 
to the pervasive problems with effective governance herein described. 
 
II. “THE TYRANT WILL SOON BE GONE, THE DAY OF YOUR LIBERATION IS NEAR”3 
 
 The year 2003 seems a rather distant memory to many of us who have been deeply 
engaged in Iraqi law and politics over the past half decade, given how much has transpired since 
then. It is easy to forget that the rush to electoral, democratic and constitutional rule was not 
preordained, and was not the preferred outcome under U.S. policy at the time of the U.S. 
invasion in April of that year. Media reports suggested that the Bush administration believed that 
the postwar occupations of Germany and Japan were considered to be the most appropriate 
model for reconstruction,4 where elections were not held for years following surrender. 
 
 The initial calls for elections did not emerge from the U.S., but rather from Iraq’s 
majority Shi’a population, and they occurred only weeks after Saddam’s statue famously came 
crashing to earth in Firdous Square. On June 4, Iraq’s highest Shi’i cleric Sayyid Ali Sistani, 
operating from Najaf, Shi’ism’s spiritual center, publicly proclaimed that the constitution needed 
to be drafted by an elected assembly.5 The swiftness with which the call for elections followed 
the downfall of Saddam is not often put into its proper perspective. Grand Ayatollah Sistani, for 
example, had spent the better part of four decades of his life under circumstances where to speak 
publicly against the government was to court the severest forms of official retribution 
imaginable. Sistani was in Najaf in 1980 when the Ba’ath abducted, tortured and killed the most 
eloquent Najaf-based clerical voice opposed to Ba’ath rule, that of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, 
along with his sister.6 He was also in Najaf when the savage, government-organized murder of a 
second cleric from the Sadr family, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, was carried out during the latter 
stages of Ba’ath rule.7 Through these and countless other acts of ruthless savagery, the Ba’ath 
had succeeded in squelching any form of political advocacy, much less intervention, on the part 
of the clerical classes. That Grand Ayatollah Sistani, by reputation a Quietist who does not 
                                                 
3 President George W. Bush, Television Address, Mar. 17, 2003, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/17/sprj.irq.bush.transcript/. 
4 David Sanger, Bush’s Next Role: Mediator in Disputes in Post War Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2003, at 
B9. 
5 LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED VICTORY 48 (2005). 
6 CHIBLI MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW 18 (1993). 
7 PATRICK COCKBURN, MUQTADA: MUQTADA AL-SADR, THE SHIA REVIVAL, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
IRAQ 105-06 (2008). 
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believe that it is the role of the clerical classes to rule the state,8 was willing after decades of such 
unspeakable repression to voice an opinion respecting the necessity of early elections, one sure 
to dismay the American occupiers at the time, is extremely telling of the extent to which the Shi’i 
elite had formulated at the earliest possible stage their demands for political power within the 
democratic ethos that permeates our contemporary global culture. 
 
 While the timing of the call for elections was spectacularly accelerated in light of the 
dizzying transition from dictatorship to occupation, the Shi’a calls should hardly come as a 
surprise. The general post Cold War global trend toward democracy had not gone unnoticed, 
even in a nation as isolated as Iraq. The Shi’a have constituted a majority in Iraq since 1919,9 yet 
have never governed the nation and indeed have been the object of pervasive and systematic 
repression on the part of numerous, previous Sunni led governments. It seems not only natural, 
but indeed virtually inevitable, that the Shi’a would demand not only recognition of political 
equality but the right to rule, and that they would use their majoritarian status to justify this right. 
 
 The dangers of precipitous elections were well known to the U.S. at the time, and the 
principal U.S. figures of the Iraqi occupation would have been keenly aware of both legal and 
policy-oriented scholarship on the topic. Yet despite American misgivings, and the collective 
wisdom about problems inherent in advancing democracy without strong government 
institutions, there was little that the U.S. could do to resist the demands. 
 
 This is not to say it did not try. Paul Bremer, the U.S. viceroy for Iraq after the invasion, 
resisted Sistani’s call for months. As late as September of 2003, Bremer announced a timetable 
for election for an Iraqi government that was to be held after the naming of a “Governing 
Council” of Iraqis handpicked by the U.S., after its naming of a constitutional preparatory 
committee, after ministers were selected to run the government (all of which had already 
transpired by that time), after the constitution was in fact written, after broad public debate on 
that constitution was undertaken, and after that constitution was approved by popular 
referendum.10 The notion of an election before the ratification of the constitution was specifically 
rejected by Bremer. The efforts of Bremer and his cohorts at the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(“CPA”) responsible for administering Iraq at the time were thus to justify delays in elections in 
the face of Iraqi demands, not hold them. That early elections might be a threat to “democracy 
and peace” was certainly one of the principal factors militating in favor of American policy at the 
time, according to one of the CPA’s senior advisers.11 
 
 Ultimately, however, the Shi’a demands carried the day. Large demonstrations were held 
throughout Iraq’s south, and the Shi’a grew demonstrably restless, demanding the right to vote. 
                                                 
8 Id. at 50; but see Haider Ala Hamoudi, Between Realism and Resistance: Shi’i Islam and the 
Contemporary Liberal State, 11 J. ISL. L. & CUL. 107, 112 (2009) (describing Sistani as “Semi- 
Quietist”). 
9 COCKBURN, supra note 7, at 26. 
10 This entire process was laid out by Ambassador Bremer in an editorial in the Washington Post. L. Paul 
Bremer, Iraq’s Path to Sovereignty, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2003, at 21. 
11 DIAMOND, supra note 4, at 48. 
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Having lost its credibility for justifying the Iraq venture on the basis of weapons of mass 
destruction, the Bush administration turned to an alternative justification for war, the liberation 
of the Iraqi people from the tyrant Saddam Hussein. With this, any hope of an election delay 
necessarily evaporated. Having spent so much time and effort describing Saddam’s well 
documented abuses of power and of human rights, and having rested the credibility of the entire 
Iraq operation, with its mounting casualties and massive costs, on his removal and the 
subsequent liberation of his people, an ounce of legitimacy to American rule would not have 
remained if the Iraqi domestic demand to vote had been denied. Ultimately, in November of 
2003, the U.S. relented, and accepted a schedule of advanced elections to be held by the start of 
2005.12 Political legitimacy in Iraq would thenceforth be determined on the basis of electoral 
results, a reality which has only been fortified over time. 
 
 Thus, the question of whether or not elections in any given political context are 
premature can often be beside the point, as it certainly was in Iraq, because conditions can make 
holding elections a necessity. Experts, academics, and the foreign authorities influenced by their 
opinions, whether the U.S. or the U.N, may be able to exert marginal control if they find that 
early elections would be a threat to “democracy and peace.” Ultimately, however, to the extent 
that local elites are confident in their ability to project greater power through the ballot box than 
they might under alternative mechanisms, they are likely to urge elections sooner rather than 
later. In support of that effort, they are likely to be able to articulate successfully a moral basis 
for the exercise of power that is not easily thwarted. It perhaps should come as no surprise to 
advocates of democratic politics that domestic constituencies wield decisive power as concerns 
domestic elections. Yet, somehow the view stubbornly persists that whether an election should or 
should not be held is a matter to be debated among policy experts, rather than a matter 
determined in fact by domestic constituencies on the basis of their own political interests. 
 
III. IDENTITARIANISM GONE WILD 
 
A. THE ELECTION LAW AMENDMENTS OF 2009 AND THE MATTER OF KIRKUK 
 
 Yet even if one concedes that the U.S. and the U.N. could not have delayed elections 
much longer than they did, one might well ask whether the elections have produced salutary 
                                                 
12 In his work, Feisal Istrabadi, a senior adviser to one of Iraq’s leading Sunni politicians, argues that in 
fact after an initial period of reluctance, the U.S., following Sistani’s pressure, forced elections over the 
objections of “virtually the entire political class in Baghdad.” Istrabadi, supra note 1, at 1635, 1639-40. 
This is certainly not my view, as it seems to me rather clear and difficult to dispute that the parties which 
ultimately won the plurality of seats in these elections, namely the religious Shi’a parties, clamored 
ceaselessly for these elections to proceed, with support from Kurdish allies, reducing, to my mind, the 
opposition to at most 30 to 35 percent of Iraq’s current political classes. That the opposition to the 
elections constituted the majority of the political class before the elections, and that the Shi’a parties 
constituted by far the largest bloc after the elections only goes to demonstrate my central claim. Domestic 
constituencies that stand to gain from early elections will demand them, and will be able to articulate a 
normative basis for them that will, in many cases, prove impossible to resist by the international 
community. Much as the international community might have favored Iraq’s smaller secular nationalist 
coalitions, these coalitions proved not nearly as representative of Iraq’s population, at least at the time of 
the first postwar elections, as anyone might have hoped. 
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results in the form of institutions of effective governance responsive to the domestic population, 
or whether they have led to greater forms of civil conflict. In the case of Iraq, there is little doubt 
that ethnic and sectarian conflict has risen as a result of democratic politics, with the concomitant 
reality that parties in Iraq project power, not on the basis of policy and effective governance, but 
rather ethnicity and sect. 
 
 Any number of examples may be offered to describe the manner in which democratic 
practices have managed to foment ethnic and sectarian divisions and thwart effective 
governance. Perhaps none is more apt, and more demonstrative of the stubborn persistence of 
this type of identitarian politics, than the Election Law Amendments of 2009 and the crisis 
generated thereby, in which I and others on a U.S. Embassy grant given to the University of Utah 
S.J. Quinney School of Law played something of a role.13 This section describes the crisis, little 
reported in the Western press, yet deeply demonstrative of the identitarian pathologies afflicting 
Iraqi politics today. Paradoxically, such pathologies persist, even as Iraq’s population 
simultaneously grows disenchanted with the ineffective, incompetent, and unprofessional 
governance that naturally result from them. 
 
 When the issue of amending the election law first arose in the Council of Representatives 
in the late summer of 2008, the primary issues appeared to be those that would attend any 
electoral system in a developing democracy. Questions arose as to how nominees would be 
selected: whether they would be selected by using a ballot that allowed voters to choose between 
a single party list (the so called “closed list”) or one that would permit a voter to select a 
candidate on a party list (the so called “open list”). Other questions, such as whether voters 
would select representatives from a particular region of Iraq, or from the entire nation, also 
emerged. None of this was surprising; and, to the extent that there was disappointment among 
Iraqis and internationals alike, it was in the fact that these issues were being decided so close to 
an election, scheduled by constitutional mandate to be less than six months away. It is true that 
the Kurdish contingent tended to favor the closed list while the Shi’a factions, prodded by the 
clerical leadership in Najaf, expressed their strong desire for an open list, but this hardly seemed 
to portend some sort of profound ethnic conflict. No serious person would believe that open and 
closed lists were the stuff of which civil wars are made, even in Iraq. Every indication within 
Baghdad was that these matters would be voted on, that the Kurds would probably lose the vote 
on the open list issue, that this was not so central to the Kurdish authorities to elicit such a strong 
objection from them (in fact individual members of their delegation made clear they supported 
the open list notwithstanding the official Kurdish rejection of it), and that the election law would 
be amended. 
 
 This changed nearly overnight as the Committee to Review the Election Law (the 
“CREL”) neared the end of its work. Two of the Arab members of the CREL from Kirkuk, Omar 
al Jibouri and Mohammad Tamimi, demanded that the vote in Kirkuk not be apportioned on the 
                                                 
13 The primary electoral expert within our own organization providing support on these amendments was 
Jaye Sitton, who attended every meeting of the Committee to Review the Election Law, and who offered 
helpful comparative advice when requested by the Committee. I am deeply indebted to her for much of 
the information concerning the amendments, as well as to the support and invaluable guidance of 
Professors Chibli Mallat, Wayne McCormack and Dean Hiram Chodosh in all of our Iraq endeavors 
together throughout 2009. Any errors set forth herein are mine alone. 
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basis of the 2009 census because, they claimed, the results had been distorted by groups of Kurds 
descending into Kirkuk like “locusts,” in Tamimi’s memorable incendiary (and deeply offensive) 
phrase.14 Al Jibouri and Tamimi argued that these Kurds had to be excluded, and forced to vote 
wherever it was that they had come from, not in Kirkuk. Ethnic politics had returned, gone were 
notions of electoral mechanisms and back was the idea that the purpose of the election was to 
maximize electoral representation of one’s own ethnic or sectarian community. Naturally, the 
Kurds vigorously opposed the proposal, arguing that any change in voter rolls was on the basis 
of legitimate repatriation permitted by the Iraq Constitution. The election law stood idle for 
months at this impasse, until finally some sort of compromise was reached. Under the 
compromise, the 2009 census would be used to determine the voter rolls in Kirkuk. In addition, a 
committee formed of the electoral commission and all major constituent communities, with the 
support of the U.N., would review the voter lists based on series of factors within one year. This 
would be about nine months after the elections of March 2010 had been held. The number of 
Kirkuk representatives would ultimately equal the number assigned on the basis of the 2009 
census, minus the number of members disqualified by voter list infractions identified by the 
committee.15 
 
 Even this compromise, however, assumes ethnically based electoral representation. How 
precisely is the “subtraction” demanded by the law supposed to occur if the election has already 
taken place and the validity of the voter rolls has yet to be finally determined? That is, Kirkuk 
has twelve representatives from its province selected by the most recent 2010 election. Six 
representatives were from the Sunni Arab nationalist list and six from the Kurdish list. If the 
commission determines that the proper number of representatives should have been ten, which 
two representatives should lose their seats? The law does not specify, and one is left to speculate. 
Surely it would not be the two with the least votes, as there would be no evidence to suggest that 
those who had cast their ballots illegally in Kirkuk had voted for representatives with the least 
votes. The only seemingly viable option, at least to the Arab representatives with whom I have 
spoken, would be to reduce the number of Kurdish representatives by the amount of tampering 
discovered, on the theory that it is the Kurds who have largely repopulated the city, and Kurdish 
people vote for Kurdish representatives. The fact that at least some of the drafters formulated a 
solution that assumes ethnically based electoral results, and that the Council of Representatives 
voted for this arrangement, is quite telling. “Subtraction” of representatives will almost certainly 
not occur, since the Kurds compose a healthy proportion of the seats on the commission and are 
virtually certain to find no tampering with the rolls, even as the Arab and Turkmen 
constituencies find evidence of widespread fraud. The compromise does, nevertheless, 
                                                 
14 As one close to those who participated directly in the CREL, I have heard the Tamimi remarks from 
more than one source who had attended the particular meeting at which they were made. As for the nature 
of the dispute more generally, and the particular personalities involved on either side, it suffices to say 
that the issues of the electoral law consumed Iraqi television and print media for the better part of two 
months, during which countless interviews and reports were provided. 
15 A version of the original proposed amendment, obtained from the Legal Committee of the Iraqi Council 
of Representatives at the time, is on file with the author. The particular article concerning Kirkuk remains 
in place as Article 6 in a revised, and currently effective, amendment to the Election Law. QANUN RAQM 
26 LI SANAT 2009, TADEEL QANUN AL-INTIKHABAT RAQM 16 LI SANAT 2005 [LAW NO. 26 OF 2009, AN 
AMENDMENT TO THE ELECTION LAW NO. 16 OF 2005], available at 
http://www.parliament.iq/dirrasd/law/2009/26.pdf. 
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demonstrate a rather pervasive tendency on the part of lawmakers to view electoral politics 
solely along identitarian lines. 
 
B. THE HASHIMI VETO AND IDENTITARIAN JOCKEYING 
 
 Our story does not end there, however. The proposed amendment was vetoed by one of 
the three members of Iraq’s Presidency Council, the Sunni Tariq al- Hashimi, who demanded 
more seats for expatriate Iraqis who are, predictably, overwhelmingly Sunni. The Council of 
Representatives responded by increasing Kurdish representation and sending the law back to 
him. Frantic negotiations occurred behind the scenes to implement the law through regulation in 
a manner that would take placate Hashimi and give him much of what he wanted so as not to 
inspire a second veto. However, this began to anger the Kurds, and of course the majority Shi’a 
were not willing to part with their representatives either. Every sphere of influence in Iraq—the 
three primary domestic communities, the U.S. and the U.N.— descended upon the electoral 
commission to negotiate the representation of each province in Iraq in the next Parliament 
through regulations implementing the law. 
 
 Finally, in an embarrassing spectacle, ten minutes before time theoretically ran out on 
Hashimi’s opportunity to veto a second time, the Council of Representatives on national 
television decided by “consensus” (in fact the show of hands demonstrated something 
considerably less than that, but the Speaker declared it “consensus” anyway and did not count the 
votes) on the distribution of seats on a province by province basis. This decision effectively 
endorsed a regulatory compromise, which the electoral commission had already reached. The 
deal was struck when the Kurds agreed in the final hour to receive three additional seats rather 
than the five they had been demanding.16 This resolution was achieved, of course, by doing no 
more than increasing the number of representatives in Kurdish provinces. While it is true that 
redistricting is not unfamiliar in the U.S., the notion that three ethnic and sectarian communities 
would until the last hour expend months of effort to maximize voting power in provinces based 
solely on their ethnic and sectarian composition assuming (with good reason) almost uniform 
voting along Sunni, Shi’i or Kurdish lines, and in the process ignoring all other responsibilities 
of lawmaking, demonstrates the extent to which identitarian politics reign supreme over effective 
governance in contemporary Iraq. 
 
C. THE END OF GOVERNANCE 
 
 Nonetheless, disturbing as the parliamentary machinations may have been, as a strategic 
matter, it did seem to be rather sensible politics to focus exclusively on maximum representation 
over effective governance in order to ensure reelection. After all, there is one major Kurdish list, 
which very large majorities of Kurds can reliably be expected to vote for, even as virtually all 
other Iraqis will vote for another slate. Thus, there is but one way for the party list to increase its 
numbers in the next Council of Representatives, and it is by increasing the numbers of 
representatives in the Kurdish provinces. The articulation of good policy is not only beside the 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Marina Ottaway & Danial Kaysi, Sunnis in Iraq, 6 Years after Saddam, Carnegie Middle East 
Center, Dec. 10, 2009, available at http://www.carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=24292&lang=en. 
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point, it is, in terms of pure political interest, an entire waste of time, as it will not lead to the 
garnering of any greater number of votes. 
 
 The March 2010 elections may have caused some easing of this phenomenon, not 
because of the rise of nonsectarian broadly based nationalist groups, which do not exist any more 
now than they did prior to March of 2010, but rather because within the identitarian groups, 
splits have begun to develop that do give voters something of a choice between parties. Thus, 
there is a (considerably) smaller Kurdish list, the Gorran party, for example, which Kurds might 
feel free to elect given sufficient disenchantment with the dominant Kurdish list.17 More notably 
the Shi’a have two lists with significant support, though the two seem to have reached some form 
of tentative alliance between themselves. All of this suggests that there might be some 
competition on the basis of policy if such choice within the identitarian groups becomes more 
firmly established. As yet, however, it is too early to tell whether this will be the case. Certainly, 
as discouraging as the stubborn persistence of identitarian politics has been, it is encouraging that 
voters have recently been willing to consider alternative choices within their respective 
identitarian groups. 
 
 In any event, the cementing of identitarian politics has led to some level of disconnection 
on the part of Iraqi politicians from their constituencies. Whereas legislatures in other nations 
avoid paying themselves lavish salaries or drawing attention to pay raises, which are often 
hidden in the details of broad omnibus bills, in Iraq the situation is quite different. In 2009, the 
Council of Representatives, blithely unconcerned about electoral consequences, voted itself a 
salary and associated benefits of approximately $26,000 per month and life-long retirements 
benefits of approximatly $8,000 per month, in a nation where the per capita monthly income is 
less than $300 per month.18 
 
 Even more poignant for this particular story is the timing of the latest pay raise. Toward 
the end of 2009, the deadlock over the amendments to the electoral law had started to become 
intractable, and it became apparent that dissatisfaction with the performance of the Iraqi Council 
of Representatives was nearing an all time high within Iraq. Friday sermons included long 
diatribes against the government, and radio call-in shows, television interviews, and newspaper 
editorials seemed to show broad levels of frustration with the government’s inability to agree on 
even a sensible electoral mechanism, let alone a host of other important legislative initiatives. It 
was at precisely this time that the Iraqi Council of Representatives amended the law concerning 
their benefits to include, among other things, diplomatic passports for themselves, their spouses, 
and their children for the entire period of their legislative tenure, and eight years following, along 
with the distribution of prime government land to such members free of charge. As I roamed the 
halls of the Council of Representatives afterwards, I detected not an ounce of hesitation or regret 
at the raise itself, but rather anger at the media for having widely publicized a matter of such 
supposed sensitivity. 
 
                                                 
17 See Sam Dagher, Bloc Takes On Entrenched Kurdish Parties in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/world/middleeast/07kurds.html. 
18 See AFP, Iraqi MP Expenses Scandal Triggers Religious Outrage, Nov. 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.france24.com/en/node/4919336. 
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 Equally important, no real attempt at justification for these salaries and benefits was 
made, difficult as such justification may have been. A Council of Representatives member, 
particularly one not serving on the Foreign Affairs Committee, would have a hard time 
explaining precisely why her son might need a diplomatic passport eight years after his mother 
had last served in the Council of Representatives. Still, it was rather disturbing that I could not 
find a member who cared enough to find a need to explain. In the end, it did not seem relevant to 
them. In an electoral space where voting loyalty is defined by ethnic or sectarian identity, the 
decision about whether to remove any given parliament member does not really lie with the 
voters. 
 
IV. VIOLENCE AND INCOMPETENCE 
 
A. THE SAMARRA’ AFFAIR 
 
 While the story I have told is a rather depressing one in any number of respects, it could 
have been much worse. Throughout this Essay are examples of ethnic and sectarian politics, 
ineffective governance, and selfish legislative disregard of constituency, but no examples of 
violence. Indeed, Iraq has been rather fortunate in this context. 
 
 This turn away from violence was hardly preordained. As identitarian politics began to 
take hold in Iraq as described in the previous sections, ethnic and sectarian tensions mounted 
throughout 2004 and 2005. Sunni leaders never came to terms with the demographic realities of 
their minority position, and opposed virtually any actions taken by the new government, from 
constitution drafting to election timetables to the establishment of a sovereign government. The 
Sunni heartland became the safe haven of Al Qaeda and its leader Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, and 
the base of operations for organized attacks against American soldiers and the broader Shi’a 
population alike, in the case of the latter, targeting them at their holiest sites and on their holiest 
days. 
 
 Still, Sunni disaffection can hardly be blamed entirely on Sunnis, as—irrespective of 
Sunni motivations—the Shi’a and the Kurds displayed little interest in genuine cooperation and 
dialogue with the minority community that had historically ruled Iraq. To provide one illustrative 
example of Sunni recalcitrance, and corresponding Shi’a and Kurdish resistance to Sunni 
participation, in 2005, Sunnis boycotted the elections that led to the creation of a constitutional 
committee. In response, the Shi’a and Kurds seemed perfectly happy to proceed in drafting the 
constitution without substantial Sunni input of any kind, which is remarkable, given that Iraq is 
25 to 30 percent Sunni Arab. Substantial Sunni participation was finally achieved due, in large 
part, to American intervention; however, participation in the constitutional process did not lead 
to widespread Sunni acceptance of the final document, mostly because the Sunnis who 
participated, and predictably objected to large portions of the document, were entirely ignored. 
 
 In February 2006, tensions that had arisen from these events burst into the open, and 
wide-scale internal violence began in earnest. This occurred in the predominantly Sunni town of 
Samarra’, where two of Shi’a Islam’s most revered figures were buried. The mosque housing the 
sacred tombs was bombed, causing severe damage. In response, for days afterwards the Mahdi 
army, a group of black-shirted Shi’a thugs led by firebrand Moqtada al Sadr, began to roam 
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Baghdad streets, seeking reprisal against the Sunni population that was presumed to have 
allowed this to happen by permitting the insurgency to flourish in its midst. The Mahdi army 
dragged people with Sunni names from their cars and shot them in the open street. Sunni areas 
reacted with similar fury, and a spate of sectarian-based murders and kidnappings followed. 
Sectarian relationships during most of the following two years were characterized by violence. 
 
 The U.S. does deserve some credit for helping to ease the tension. Part of this was 
achieved through the well-known “surge” in American troop levels, which not only flooded 
troubled areas with American soldiers who had no real stake in the identitarian violence, but 
more importantly, delivered a desperately needed signal to the Iraqi authorities that America’s 
role in the crisis would be robust. Also central was America’s engagement with the Sunni tribes 
in the Sunni heartland of Anbar that secured their cooperation with the U.S. The U.S. also played 
a widely-reported role in encouraging Prime Minister Maliki to act decisively against the Shi’a 
extremist Mahdi army in Basra and the Sunni extremist Al Qaeda groups in Anbar province, and 
to restore government control in both areas. 
 
 As is usual in Western media accounts, the desires of Iraqi stakeholders were unfairly 
minimized in importance relative to the interests of the U.S. and the international community. It 
seems clear that Maliki was interested in projecting strength, and indeed made the two military 
ventures in Basra and Anbar the centerpiece of his campaign in the 2008 provincial elections. He 
renamed his party “the Rule of Law Coalition” and promised to further advance security gains. 
The Iraqi population’s support for this security-based platform was amply demonstrated by 
Maliki’s extraordinary performance in the polls in the provincial elections of 2009 and his strong 
showing in the national elections held in March, 2010. Likewise, Sunni tribes were a natural and 
easy target for the U.S. to win over as allies, as Al Qaeda and other groups like it had proved 
incapable of governance. These groups delivered little to the citizenry of the towns they had 
occupied, including Falluja, except a broad and bewildering set of purportedly Islamic rules that 
the local population found bizarre and extreme. 
 
 Nevertheless, while the U.S. is not solely responsible for orchestrating the dramatic turn 
of events, its role was quite important, and seemingly long lasting. Al Qaeda and other insurgent 
elements may exist in Iraq, but they remain in the shadows, capable of spectacular bombings 
from time to time, but unable to control territory in any part of Iraq, and constantly subject to 
surveillance and arrest. The Mahdi army, and its leader Moqtada al-Sadr, stunned by its losses in 
the polls in 2008, appears to have embraced the political process with some fervor, even holding 
primaries to select its candidates for the national elections just held. Sunni tribes which in early 
2008 regarded the U.S. with some suspicion and the Iraqi government with contempt, likewise 
engaged fully in the national elections. 
 
B. THE PRICE OF CONSENSUAL POLITICS 
 
 Thus, the U.S. can claim some level of success in helping to avoid identitarian violence 
on a larger scale. After Sunni election boycotts, Najaf-led Shi’a demonstrations, and Kurdish 
votes concerning the right to self determination, it cannot well be denied that a form of 
consensual politics reigns in Baghdad, that the U.S. has helped achieve this, and that this has 
something to do with the relative lack of violence between ethnic communities, even as tensions 
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remain high and levels of ordinary street violence are among the most pervasive on earth. In 
other words, while politics is plagued with ethnic and sectarian maximalism, it remains largely 
political. 
 
 Yet the problem with consensual politics is that it requires consensus. If the Shi’a, or the 
Shi’a and the Kurds working together, were to ignore their Sunni counterparts and proceed 
without them, as they did in the drafting of the constitution in 2005, ethnic tensions would 
undoubtedly rise again. Yet to demand full consensus is, almost by necessity, to settle for 
ineffective governance. These communities hold widely divergent visions of the public order—
of state organization, the role of religion, and the respective powers of center and regions. The 
result of ineffective, incompetent, and gridlocked government is all but foreordained in a system 
where power is evenly divided among the different groups—where the Presidency is controlled 
by a tripartite Presidency Council, where each member has a right to veto, where the Speaker of 
a legislature has two deputies who, as a matter of custom and practice, have the same power as 
the Speaker to block a measure from reaching the floor, where not only the Ministers themselves 
must be carefully balanced by sect and ethnic group, but also (again as a matter of custom and 
practice) the Deputy Ministers and even Director Generals within each Ministry, where the 
Prime Minister may not dismiss his own Ministers without legislative approval, and where it is 
conceded that nothing may be done except by agreement of all relevant factions. 
 
 The Council of Representatives has been unable to pass a hydrocarbon law despite the 
plain material interests, locally and globally, militating in favor of such a law. Constitutional 
amendments demanded by Iraq’s Sunni community await enactment as well. Basic governmental 
services are astonishingly poor in some areas and nonexistent in others. Government offices, 
public buildings, and courtrooms are a travesty, even by the rather low standards of the region; at 
these government buildings, it is common to see large crowds of people standing about for hours, 
a guard standing in front of the door where the judge, official, or clerk sits, refusing entry 
without a bribe. Those lucky enough to enter are usually sent away unsatisfied. Stories of 
couples having spent weeks attempting unsuccessfully to record their marriages in personal 
status court are not uncommon. 
 
 Frustrated Iraqis have nowhere to turn to raise complaints, as there is no clear chain of 
command within the ministries; instead, they operate by consensus among competing factions. 
Centralized dictatorships with clear lines of authority, including those of the previous regime, 
suddenly seem to have developed some appeal: in these regimes at least, a misbehaving soldier 
would be called to account by a senior officer for harassing neighborhood women (even if the 
same would not be true for the dictator’s son). 
 
 Yet with all of these problems, it is hard to know how to remedy the situation. Either 
government action by consensus remains the norm, even though it results in largely ineffective 
governance, or a single group takes control over the state apparatus, even though it will 
inexorably lead to conflict. Until broad-based, pan-ethnic national coalitions develop, a process 
which might take decades, it is either ethnic politics or ethnic conflict. This is hardly an 
appealing choice, but it is an unavoidable one, at least for the time being. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
 It is a mistake to assume that matters such as the electoral timetables of other nations, 
even those under foreign occupation such as Iraq, are within the primary control of members of 
the international community, rather than domestic constituencies who may stand to benefit from 
the rise of democratic politics. Thus, whether or not early elections in divided societies are a 
good idea is entirely beside the point. While it may be true, and certainly was true in the case of 
Iraq, that early elections led to a rise in civil conflict, the role of the international community 
may only be limited to mitigating the effects of that inevitable conflict, often at enormous 
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